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The Argument We Cannot Escape

Consider what happens when two strangers quarrel bitterly over a broken promise or an unpaid debt. Neither reaches first for force; each insists instead that the other has violated a standard both are somehow expected to recognize. This ordinary appeal, which surfaces on playgrounds and in courtrooms alike, exposes something curious about human nature. We behave as though a shared measure of fairness existed long before either person arrived to argue. Even the practiced cynic, who claims that right and wrong are illusions, grows indignant the moment he himself is cheated, and his outrage quietly betrays the very standard his theory denies. If morality were merely private preference, such disputes would dissolve into indifferent shrugs. Yet we argue precisely because we assume that the other party ought to agree with us. That quiet assumption, so common we scarcely notice it, is the first clue that a moral law lies deeper than opinion.